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Abstract
Background: Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the continuing infection of health care workers (HCWs)
with Ebola virus during the current outbreak in Sierra Leone has occurred in settings other than Ebola isolation
units, and it is likely that some proportion of acquisition by HCWs occurs outside the workplace. There is a critical
need to define more precisely the pathways of Ebola infection among HCWs, to optimise measures for reducing
risk during current and future outbreaks.
Methods: We conducted a retrospective descriptive study of Ebola acquisition among health workers in Sierra
Leone during May–December 2014. The data used were obtained mainly from the national Ebola database, a
cross-sectional survey conducted through administration of a structured questionnaire to infected HCWs, and
key informant interviews of select health stakeholders.
Results: A total of 293 HCWs comprising 277 (95 %) confirmed, 6 (2 %) probable, and 10 (3 %) suspected
cases of infection with Ebola virus were enrolled in the study from nine districts of the country. Over half of
infected HCWs (153) were nurses; others included laboratory staff (19, 6.5 %), doctors (9, 3.1 %), cleaners and
porters (9, 3.1 %), Community Health Officers (8, 2.7 %), and pharmacists (2, 0.7 %). HCW infections were mainly
reported from the Western Area (24.9 %), Kailahun (18.4 %), Kenema (17.7 %), and Bombali (13.3 %) districts. Almost
half of the infected HCWs (120, 47.4 %) believed that their exposure occurred in a hospital setting. Others believed
that they were exposed in the home (48, 19 %), at health centres (45, 17.8 %), or at other types of health facilities
(13, 5.1 %). Only 27 (10.7 %) of all HCW infections were associated with Ebola virus disease (EVD) isolation units.
Over half (60 %, 150) of infected HCWs said they had been trained in infection prevention and control prior to
their infection, whereas 34 % (85) reported that they had not been so trained.
Conclusions: This study demonstrated the perception that most HCW infections are associated with general health
care and home settings and not with dedicated EVD settings, which should provide substantial reassurance to HCWs
that measures in place at dedicated EVD facilities generally provide substantial protection when fully adhered to.
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Background
Ebola virus disease (EVD) is an infectious disease caused
by a virus belonging to the Filoviridae family of RNA vi-
ruses. Ebola virus is transmitted from human to human,
primarily through close contact with the body fluids or
corpse of an EVD patient or contact with contaminated
environments. Transmission appears most likely with
advanced disease when viral load is high and the patient
has uncontrolled diarrhoea, vomiting, and bleeding [1].
The ongoing EVD outbreak in West Africa that began in
December 2013 is unprecedented. As of 4 February
2015, a total 22,495 cases (confirmed, probable, and sus-
pected) and 8981 deaths (case fatality rate, (CFR) 40 %)
had been reported in nine countries, namely, Guinea,
Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, the
United Kingdom and United States [2]. The Government
of Sierra Leone (GoSL), through its Ministry of Health
and Sanitation (MOHS), declared an EVD outbreak in
the country on 25 May 2014 following laboratory con-
firmation of a suspected case in the eastern district of
Kailahun, which borders Guinea and Liberia. As of 4
February 2014, a total 10,740 cases (8059 confirmed, 287
probable, and 2394 suspected) and 3276 deaths (CFR
30.5 %) had been recorded in the country [2].
Health care delivery settings play major roles in the
propagation of EVD outbreaks [3]. In such settings, the
risk is high for health care workers (HCWs) to come in
direct contact with patients with advanced EVD, their
body fluids, and contaminated environments, if strict in-
fection prevention and control (IPC) is not practiced [4].
Nursing a patient or assisting with childbirth are some
of the major risk factors for acquisition of EVD in health
facility settings [5, 6]. In Sierra Leone, the estimated cu-
mulative incidence rate of EVD is 8285 per 100,000
population among HCWs, more than 100 times higher
than that of the general population (incidence of 80.4
per 100,000) [7]. This high EVD incidence rate reiterates
the vulnerability of HCWs to nosocomial transmission
of the disease. HCW infections in this outbreak have
exceeded those recorded in all other outbreaks in Africa
combined [8]. In the first 9 months of the outbreak, 318
HCWs had been infected in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone, with 152 deaths (CFR 48 %) [2]. By February
2015, these figures had almost tripled, with an estimated
822 HCW infections and 488 deaths (CFR 59 %) in the
three countries [2]. As of that date, more than 250
HCWs had been infected in Sierra Leone, with mortality
estimated at 77 %. This represents serious deterioration
of already precarious human resources for health (HRH)
situation in the country [8, 9]. The resulting apprehen-
sion and loss of morale among HCWs has caused many
to abandon their work, thereby amplifying the impact of
EVD on health service delivery in Sierra Leone. General
EVD prevention and control efforts were strengthened
in the country during August 2014 and basic IPC train-
ing for HCWs was intensified beginning in September
2014.
Because EVD is associated with life-threatening dis-
ease and death, it represents a major risk for HCWs and
a threat to the operation of health care systems. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that much of the ongoing acqui-
sition of infection during the current outbreak has
occurred in settings other than EVD isolation units, and
it is likely that some proportion of acquisition by HCWs
occurs outside the workplace [7]. There is therefore a
critical need to define more precisely the pathways of
EVD acquisition by HCWs, to optimise measures for re-
ducing risks during the current and future outbreaks.
In this study, we investigated the pattern of EVD infec-
tion among HCWs during the 2014 EVD outbreak in
Sierra Leone. The objectives were to describe the epi-
demiology of EVD infection among HCWs and clarify
the locations, sources, and modes of HCW exposure to
and acquisition of EVD in the country. We also assessed
self-reported IPC training, knowledge, and practice
among infected HCWs.
Methods
We conducted a retrospective descriptive study of EVD
acquisition among HCWs in Sierra Leone from May to
December 2014. We obtained the study data from three
main sources: 1) the national EVD database, which is an
Epi Info application called Viral Hemorrhagic Fever
(VHF), developed by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) [10]; 2) a cross-sectional survey
conducted through administration of a structured ques-
tionnaire to infected HCWs; 3) key informant interviews
of select health stakeholders in the affected districts.
We extracted case investigation data for all HCWs
listed in the national VHF database from May through
December 2014. A HCW is defined as any person in-
volved in the promotion, protection, or improvement of
the health of the population [11]. Based on this defin-
ition, we included all categories of workers who are dir-
ectly or indirectly involved in EVD health services
delivery. These include doctors, clinical officers, nurses,
community health officers, surveillance officers, ambu-
lance drivers, and support staff (hygienists, porters, and
others). All HCWs in the database were listed for study.
We descriptively analysed the HCW data using Epi
Info 7. Preliminary analysis revealed underestimation
of HCW infections in several districts and missing
data, such as location, mode, and type of exposure,
which are required to better characterise EVD trans-
mission among HCWs.
To collect additional data, a structured questionnaire
was developed, pre-tested, and administered to all HCWs
in the national database, as well as to other infected
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HCWs identified by the District Health Management
Teams (DHMTs). The questionnaire contained 42 ques-
tions and sub-questions that were categorised into four
main sections, i.e., HCW identity, exposure, and know-
ledge and practice of IPC. Six data collectors were identi-
fied (three from the WHO data management team, who
are co-authors of this paper, and three external candi-
dates) and trained on the study protocol and question-
naire administration, to ensure that the questionnaire was
administered in a uniform manner. The data collectors
then pre-tested the questionnaire and administered the
final version to respondents.
Nine districts that reported HCW infections during
the study period were covered. All surviving HCWs were
interviewed in person. In cases of HCWs who had died,
next of kin or close associates were interviewed. A rela-
tive or close associate was defined as a spouse, parent,
brother or sister who was close to or lived with the de-
ceased HCW. To ensure completeness of data, col-
leagues working in the same health facility as deceased
HCWs were also interviewed, in order to obtain
workplace-related information that could not be pro-
vided by relatives or associates.
Qualitative data were collected through key informant
interviews of District Medical Officers (DMOs) and
Matrons at district hospitals in selected districts. A pur-
posive sampling method was used to identify four high
transmission districts, namely, Kenema, Port Loko,
Bombali and Tonkolili. A fifth district, Bonthe, which
had not reported any HCW infections at the time of our
study, was also selected to better understand the chal-
lenges of EVD prevention in non-transmission districts.
A key informant interview guide was developed by the
research team and used to interview DMOs and
Matrons in these districts. The key informant interview
guide had five main questions that explored the avail-
ability and implementation of IPC policies in the dis-
tricts, the perceived causes of HCW infection, the
challenges associated with ensuring HCW safety, and
what could be done to prevent HCW infection in the fu-
ture. The key informant interviews were conducted by
two members of the research team; six key informant in-
terviews were conducted in total.
Survey data were entered into a Microsoft Excel data-
base, cleaned, and then exported into Epi Info 7. In the
first stage of analysis, we conducted univariate analyses
on all variables in the database. In the second stage, we
performed detailed descriptive analyses on the key vari-
ables. The descriptive analyses included the distribution
of cases and deaths for person, location, time, IPC
knowledge, disease outcome, location and type of expos-
ure. We obtained the total number of HCWs in Sierra
Leone from the National Health Sector Strategic Plan
2010–2015 [12] and used this to calculate the rate of
EVD infection among HCWs. The key informant inter-
view data were transcribed, and responses were coded
and collated [13]. Some respondents did not respond to
all the questions, which explains the differences in de-
nominators in some results.
This study was part of extended epidemiological inves-
tigations to provide scientific evidence for initiating tai-
lored interventions to control the EVD outbreak in
Sierra Leone. The study was approved by the MOHS.
All data presented herein are anonymous. In collabor-
ation with the MOHS and DHMTs, the data collectors
identified the affected HCWs, explained the study pur-
pose, and obtained their verbal consent to participate in
the study.
Results
A total of 293 HCWs comprising 277 (95 %) confirmed,
six (2 %) probable, and 10 (3 %) suspected cases were
enrolled in the study from nine districts of Sierra Leone:
Bo, Bombali, Kailahun, Kenema, Kono, Moyamba, Port
Loko, Tonkolili, and the Western Area (Table 1). Based
on an estimated total of 2435 HCWs in the country,
12 % were infected during the study period. More males
were infected than females (Table 2). The most affected
HCW age groups were 26–35 and 36–45 years old
(Table 2), with mean, median and range of the age
groups at 40.3, 39 and 20–70 years, respectively. Over
half the infected HCWs were nurses. Other groups in-
cluded laboratory staff (19, 6.5 %), doctors (9, 3.1 %),
cleaners and porters (9, 3.1 %), Community Health
Officers (8, 2.7 %), and pharmacists (2, 0.7 %). HCW in-
fections were mainly reported from the Western Area,
Kailahun, Kenema and Bombali districts (Table 1). Port
Loko, the district with the second highest number of re-
ported EVD cases in the outbreak, accounted for only
6.8 % (20) of all HCW infections. The first HCW infec-
tions were reported in epidemiological week 21 of 2014
(week ending 24 May 2014). Subsequently, two peaks
were observed from epidemiological weeks 33 through
38 (11 August through 21 September 2014)) and 41
through 43 (6 to 26 October 2014). A smaller peak was
observed in epidemiological week 48 (24 through 30
November 2014) (Fig. 1).
Almost half the infected HCWs believed that their ex-
posure had occurred in a hospital setting. Others be-
lieved that they were exposed in the home (48, 19 %), at
health centres (45, 17.8 %), or at other types of health fa-
cilities (13, 5.1 %). Only 10.7 % of all HCW infections
were associated with EVD isolation units (Fig. 2).
Among those that reported exposure to the virus in the
home setting, the respondents said that the patient they
had physical contact with was a family member (41 %),
another HCW (20 %), or a friend (9 %). Nearly all (91 %)
of infected HCWs recalled having been in contact with
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an EVD patient within the 3 weeks prior to onset of
their symptoms. Of those who reported contact with an
EVD patient prior to symptom onset, 35 % (88) and
19 % (47) said they had come in contact with confirmed
and suspected cases, respectively, whereas 46 % (117)
did not know the status of the patient with whom they
had contact. In this context, “contact” was defined as
having unprotected bodily contact with a suspected,
probable, or confirmed EVD case during patient care, in
either a health facility or home setting. A total 87 % of
respondents said that they were aware of the specific ex-
posure that had resulted in their infection, whereas 13 %
were unable to pinpoint the specific exposure. More
than half (57 %, 138) of the infected HCWs were aware
of the exact time of their exposure/infection, whereas
106 (43 %) reported that they were unaware of this time.
Concerning mode of exposure, 55 % of respondents
said that exposure was through general medical and
nursing care of infected persons. Other modes of infec-
tion were direct body contact with an EVD patient, con-
tact with a contaminated surface, transport of an EVD
patient, or during removal of personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) (Table 3). The most common types of ex-
posure were parenteral (e.g., needle stick injury) and
direct contact of mucous membranes with infectious
material (Table 3). Blood and body fluid containing
visible blood were the two most common types of in-
fectious materials involved, and most respondents
identified their hands as the body part that had been
contaminated (Table 3). Although a high percentage
of infected HCWs (57 %) presented to a treatment
centre within 3 days of symptom onset, a sizable per-
centage (43 %) presented 4 or more days after mani-
festing symptoms (Table 4). Many respondents
reported that they had performed hand hygiene at the
time of exposure (Table 5).
The level of awareness among infected HCWs about
IPC and the availability of IPC facilities and policies in
the health facilities where they worked at the time of
their infection provide insight into the factors contribut-
ing to the occurrence of EVD infection among HCWs. A
significant percentage of infected HCWs reported having
been trained in IPC prior to their infection (Table 5). Of
those who were trained, 69 % had received only basic
IPC training and 31 % were trained as part of their gen-
eral medical or nursing education. Furthermore, 60 % of
the trained HCWs said they had been trained during the
outbreak. Many respondents reported an IPC policy in
place at their workplace at the time of their infection,
and a large percentage reported available hygiene sta-
tions or facilities. A few respondents reported a func-
tional triage system at their facility. However, several of
the infected HCWs working in a hospital setting said
that there were no IPC policies at their workplace
(Table 5).
About half the DMOs and Matrons interviewed stated
that they were unaware of a national IPC policy at the
onset of the outbreak but that standard precautions were
being taken in many of their health care facilities. Al-
most all interviewees identified district hospitals and
EVD holding centres as the most difficult places to im-
plement IPC measures aimed at ensuring HCW safety.
Table 1 Distribution of infected HCWs in Sierra Leone, May through December 2014
District Case classification(n) Outcome of infection (%)
Suspected Probable Confirmed Total Survived Died
Bo 4 0 14 18 (6.1 %) 50 % 50 %
Bombali 0 0 39 39 (13.3 %) 15 % 85 %
Kailahun 1 4 49 54 (18.4 %) 19 % 81 %
Kenema 0 0 52 52 (17.7 %) 19 % 81 %
Kono 0 0 10 10 (3.4 %) 29 % 71 %
Moyamba 3 0 3 6 (2 %) 50 % 50 %
Port Loko 0 0 20 20 (6.8 %) 25 % 75 %
Tonkolili 1 1 19 21 (7.2 %) 29 % 71 %
Western Area 1 1 71 73 (24.9 %) 23 % 77 %
Total 10 6 277 293 23 % 77 %
Table 2 Age and sex distribution of EVD-infected HCWs in
Sierra Leone, May through December 2014
Age group
(years)
Gender (%) Total (%)
Male Female
18 – 25 11 (79 %) 3 (21 %) 14 (5.0 %)
26 – 35 56 (59 %) 39 (41 %) 95 (33.7 %)
36 – 45 44 (46 %) 51 (54 %) 95 (33.7 %)
46 – 55 32 (62 %) 20 (38 %) 52 (18.4 %)
56 – 65 16 (64 %) 9 (36 %) 25 (8.9 %)
66 – 75 1 (100 %) 0 (0 %) 1 (0.4 %)
Total 160 (56.7 %) 122 (43.3 %)
Olu et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:416 Page 4 of 9
Fig. 1 Epidemic curve of EVD among HCW in Sierra Leone - May to December 2014
Fig. 2 Reported association of infection with working in a particular health care setting
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The interviewees perceived common factors contribut-
ing to HCW infection in their districts to be the follow-
ing: “negligence” (defined as non-adherence to basic IPC
rules) and “overconfidence” (defined as a feeling of
knowing the rules despite the opposite being true) of
HCWs, both often resulting in breaches in IPC protocol;
inadequate supervision; delayed and inadequate IPC train-
ing; inadequate supplies of IPC materials; poor triage sys-
tems at their health facilities. All interviewees stated that
regular refresher IPC training, the availability of standard
IPC protocols at all health facilities, strong support super-
vision, adequate provision of standard holding and treat-
ment centres, uninterrupted supplies of IPC materials,
and regular IPC audits would help prevent HCW infec-
tions in the current and future EVD outbreaks.
Discussion
EVD infection among HCWs is a major concern in rela-
tion to both the welfare of HCWs and sustainability of
health care services during outbreaks. It is therefore im-
portant to understand the scale of EVD acquisition by
HCWs and contributing factors, to assist in the develop-
ment of appropriate prevention strategies. This study
represents a contribution toward that goal. A key finding
of the study is that most HCW infections are associated
with general health care and home settings but not with
dedicated EVD settings. This has clarified the hitherto
widely held belief that HCWs working in dedicated EVD
facilities are at especially high risk compared with other
HCWs. This finding should provide substantial reassur-
ance to HCWs that measures in place at dedicated EVD
facilities generally provide substantial protection when
fully adhered to. This should in turn encourage more
HCWs to volunteer for work in dedicated EVD isolation
units. This result may also help alleviate the significant
stigmatisation of HCWs working in such EVD facilities
in Sierra Leone, which includes family and community
rejection, isolation, and violence [14, 15].
HCW infections continue to be reported during this
outbreak, despite initiatives intended to manage the
risks. These initiatives include establishment of dedi-
cated EVD isolation units, basic IPC training of health
workers, and provision of PPE. This situation could be
attributed to a number of reasons. First, a sizable per-
centage (34 %) of infected HCWs interviewed had not
been trained in basic IPC at the time of their infection.
Second, among those who were trained, more than 31 %
had only been trained as part of their general medical or
nursing education, which meant that their knowledge
and skills in IPC may have been rudimentary because
training was received a long time ago. Third, basic IPC
training, which was intensified in September 2014, may
have had a limited impact on the behaviour of trained
Table 3 Mode and type of exposure of infected HCWs






medical and nursing care
136 55.3 %





to EVD isolation unit
10 4.1 %
During removal of PPE 7 2.8 %













Direct contact of infectious
material with non-intact
skin such as cuts
21 7 %
Splash 21 7 %
Others 122 42 %
Type of infectious
material (n = 208)
Blood 68 32.7 %
Body fluid with visible
blood
91 43.8 %
Vomitus 30 14.4 %
Faeces 3 1.4 %





Vaginal secretion 1 0.5 %
Contaminated body
part (n = 292)
Face 21 7.2 %
Hand 237 81.2 %
Arm 13 4.5 %
Leg 2 0.7 %
Foot 4 1.4 %
Torso 3 1.0 %
Others 12 4.1 %
Table 4 Time interval between onset of symptoms and
admission to a treatment centre
Time interval
in days
No and percentage of observation
Alive (%) Dead (%) Total (% time interval)
0 – 3 33 (26 %) 92 (74 %) 125 (57 %)
4 – 7 16 (25 %) 47 (75 %) 63 (29 %)
8 – 11 7 (28 %) 18 (72 %) 25 (11 %)
12 and above 1 (17 %) 5 (83 %) 6 (3 %)
Total 57 (26 %) 162 (74 %) 219 (100 %)
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HCWs. These trainings were typically one-off events in
classroom settings, which are not comparable to condi-
tions in the red zone of an actual EVD isolation unit or
hospital setting. It is now generally recognised that such
classroom education sessions have limited impact on
HCW behaviour and organisational culture regarding
IPC. In the absence of effective, ongoing audit pro-
grammes and supervisory structures in the workplace,
non-adherence to basic IPC practice is commonplace,
even in well-resourced settings. A sizable percentage of
HCWs reported that the body part that had been con-
taminated was the hands, despite having performed
hand hygiene at the time of exposure. The fact that these
HCWs nevertheless became infected may indicate in-
appropriate hand hygiene technique.
The present findings show that hospitals and health
centres were the most difficult health care settings for
ensuring patient and HCW safety during the EVD out-
break. Factors that contributed to this vulnerability
include weak management systems that resulted in fre-
quent stock out of essential IPC material supplies, failure
to identify the patients most likely to have transmissible
infection (poor triage), and inadequate IPC facilities and
training. There is also a lack of monitoring and supervi-
sion to support good IPC practice in many of the
facilities. The observed high incidence of HCW infection
in home settings may be attributed to a number of
factors. In resource-poor African communities, self-
medication and home management of minor ailments
is common. In such settings, the first point of call for
treatment is usually the home of relatives, friends, or
close associates who are HCWs. Furthermore, private
medical practice (often under suboptimal clinical con-
ditions) to supplement personal income may have
been a factor in HCW infection during the outbreak.
Improved basic training in IPC as a core component
of HCW training can be expected to enhance HCW
capacity to recognise situations in which they are
dealing with patients that may pose a high risk of in-
fection, thereby enabling the HCWs to manage the
risk more effectively, even in an informal setting.
Although a sizable proportion of the infected HCWs
in the study were aware of the time and incident that re-
sulted in their exposure, late presentation of infected
HCWs to treatment facilities was a major issue. Delayed
presentation could again be linked to the powerful
stigma associated with EVD. Unpublished observations
show that HCWs tend to hide their symptoms, perhaps
for fear of ending up in the suspect or confirmed ward
of an EVD treatment centre where conditions may not
Table 5 Training of infected HCWs on IPC and availability of IPC facilities and policies at time of HCW infection (by work location)
Responses Number of observations
Responses Home setting Health care centre Hospital setting Isolation unit Other units Total
Infected HCW trained on IPC (n = 249) Yes 24 (53 %) 14 (30 %) 80 (68 %) 24 (89 %) 8 (62 %) 150 (60 %)
No 19 (42 %) 27 (57 %) 33 (28 %) 3 (11 %) 3 (23 %) 85 (34 %)
Don’t Know 2 (4 %) 6 (13 %) 4 (3 %) 0 (0 %) 2 (15 %) 14 (6 %)
Total 45 47 117 27 13 249
Availability of IPC policy (n = 250) Yes 6 (13 %) 27 (56 %) 47 (40 %) 20 (74 %) 5 (38 %) 105 (42 %)
No 35 (78 %) 16 (33 %) 66 (56 %) 5 (19 %) 6 (46 %) 128 (51 %)
Don’t Know 4 (9 %) 5 (10 %) 4 (3 %) 2 (7 %) 2 (15 %) 17 (7 %)
Total 45 48 117 27 13 250
Availability of triage system (n = 251) Yes 8 (18 %) 8 (17 %) 47 (40 %) 23 (85 %) 3 (23 %) 89 (35 %)
No 35 (78 %) 37 (77 %) 67 (57 %) 4 (15 %) 7 (54 %) 150 (60 %)
Don’t Know 2 (4 %) 3 (6 %) 4 (3 %) 0 (0 %) 3 (23 %) 12 (5 %)
Total 45 48 118 27 13 251
Availability of hand hygiene (n = 252) Yes 24 (53 %) 27 (56 %) 100 (84 %) 27 (100 %) 7 (54 %) 185 (73 %)
No 17 (38 %) 13 (27 %) 16 (13 %) 0 (0 %) 4 (31 %) 50 (20 %)
Don’t Know 4 (9 %) 8 (17 %) 3 (3 %) 0 (0 %) 2 (15 %) 17 (7 %)
Total 45 48 119 27 13 252
Hand hygiene performed (n = 245) Yes 18 (42 %) 24 (51 %) 93 (80 %) 25 (96 %) 5 (38 %) 165 (67 %)
No 18 (42 %) 10 (21 %) 13 (11 %) 1 (4 %) 6 (46 %) 48 (20 %)
Don’t Know 7 (16 %) 13 (28 %) 10 (9 %) 0 (0 %) 2 (15 %) 32 (13 %)
Total 43 47 116 26 13 245
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be comfortable for them, or fear of losing their jobs and
source of income (mainly among junior cadres of
HCWs).
HCW acquisition of EVD signifies basic deficiencies
in implementation of and adherence to core IPC
practices. Furthermore, the present study highlights
the challenges associated with control of nosocomial
transmission of pathogens in sub-Saharan African set-
tings where health systems and basic IPC capacities
are weak or lacking. The loss of nearly 10 % of
HCWs in Sierra Leone is a major detriment that un-
dermines the system and generates a vicious cycle of
inadequate health care, increased nosocomial infec-
tion, and further weakening of the system. This pro-
duces a situation that will take years to rebuild [9].
Apart from the severe impact on HRH demonstrated
by the study, the outbreak has also negatively affected
health service delivery, health care financing, and gov-
ernance. Bolkan et al. described a 50 % reduction in
major surgeries and 70 % reduction in-patient ad-
missions between May and October 2014 in Sierra
Leone, likely owing to closure of health facilities be-
cause of the Ebola outbreak [16]. Delamou et al. [17]
also attributed the reduction in reproductive health
services in EVD-affected countries to desertion of
health workers from health facilities, owing to fear of
infection. It is important to note that the pre-Ebola
health system situation in Sierra Leone was dire [18].
The current outbreak has further weakened the
already fragile health care system in the country.
Study limitations
Our study is subject to a number of limitations. The first
is recall bias, which is an inherent limitation of a retro-
spective study. This is magnified by the traumatic expe-
riences of survivors that may have affected their
responses. The second limitation was the use of indirect
sources, such as next of kin and professional colleagues
of HCWs, in cases where HCWs enrolled in the study
had died by the time of initial data collection. The third
limitation is related to incompleteness of the national
VHF database, so that we may not have identified
and interviewed all infected HCWs during the study
period. These limitations raise potential data quality
problems. However, these were addressed through
pre-testing of the questionnaire, in-depth training of
the data collectors, peer review of completed ques-
tionnaires, and follow-up interviews when necessary.
Fourth, we were unable to calculate reliable rates
(such as attack rates), because of the unavailability of
accurate denominators (exact numbers of HCWs at
the time of the study). Finally, reasons for delay in
seeking health care were not included in the study
questionnaire; insight into the reasons for this was
therefore collected during the key informant inter-
views and from our field observations.
Conclusions
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that the risk of
acquiring EVD applies to HCWs working in both EVD
isolation units and general health care settings. We con-
firm the findings of other studies that nursing staff are a
high-risk group for EVD infection [5]. The study also
points to engagement of HCWs in unregulated private
health care delivery outside formal health care settings
as a risk. It is clear that workers in dedicated EVD facil-
ities represent a small minority of those affected. There-
fore, an effective response to reduce HCW infection is
strong emphasis on reinforcing IPC capacity in general
and in informal health care settings [19, 20]. In addition
to reducing the impact of diseases such as EVD on
HCWs, building IPC capacity will generally be of great
benefit to the safety of patients and HCWs. One aspect
of this is sensitising HCWs about the similarities be-
tween early clinical features of EVD and other endemic
infectious diseases (such as malaria) that do not represent
a similar risk. Such training should be comprehensive and
focus on providing HCWs with hands-on experience in
actual health facility settings. Ineffective health systems,
which are prevalent in sub-Saharan African countries
where EVD outbreaks occur, present a major challenge to
achieving zero risk of nosocomial transmission of EVD.
However, thorough understanding of the risk factors asso-
ciated with transmission of the disease among HCWs
early in the course of an outbreak and prompt instatement
of remedial actions are likely to substantially protect
HCWs against EVD and other virulent pathogens. The
role of strong health systems in reducing nosocomial in-
fection of HCW cannot be overemphasised, and should be
integrated into all future EVD preparedness activities.
Based on our findings, we give two main recommen-
dations aimed at preventing and reducing HCW infec-
tions during the current and future EVD outbreaks.
First, clinical audit systems for real-time supervision,
monitoring and evaluation of HCW infections should be
established now and early in the course of future EVD
outbreaks. Such systems will assure early detection, in-
vestigation, documentation, and response to nosocomial
infection of HCWs. Second, a minimum standard of IPC
practice that includes implementation of standard and
transmission-based precautions should be defined and
implemented. This process should involve development
of a cadre of IPC specialists who can support implemen-
tation of appropriate IPC/patient safety policies, strat-
egies, and guidelines. This in turn must be supported by
uninterrupted supplies of basic IPC materials, such as
hand hygiene products, gloves, aprons, and disinfectants
to all health facilities in Sierra Leone.
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